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Abstract. It should be interesting to study here the moment when Louis 
Althusser, just before the “sixty-eight” period, poses the doctrinal return to Lenin 
as a precondition towards “theoretical anti-humanism”. This concept opens the 
way to ideas such as the “death of Man”, the ideological underpinning of trans-
humanism, borderless, and transgender movements. It is necessary, therefore, to 
draw the theoretical path of this return, as happened to the detriment of this other 
model of theoretical explanation of history’s grammar, such as “social interaction” 
(which thinks the morphology of complex societies as a dynamic movement 
dialectically generated by the permanence of the so-called “social conflict”), and 
that it is possible institutional resolution, at least in a democratic regime. 
 




The interest in Nietzsche and Bataille was not a way to distance 
ourselves from Marxism or Communism. It was the only way to 
get to what we expected from Communism  
(Foucault 1966, 50) 
 
 
We shall first establish the normative filiation, in apologetic shape, 
to Lenin, operated in France by Althusser in 1968 with Lenin and 
Philosophy1, and especially in Marx & Lenin before Hegel 2. Derrida 
confirmed this in 1971, in Positions 3. There will be also seen the 
vicissitudes of this affiliation in Bataille, Blanchot, Derrida, 
Foucault, and Lyotard. It is a question of empirically showing, 
through some texts, how this filiation could have been practised 
there.  
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The French filiation is very different, even opposed in some ways 
to the German one, operating from Adorno to Honneth via 
Habermas. These critical and interactionist positions are different 
from the hypercritical negativist ones, like those belonging to the 
first. The French concept of “domination”4, for instance, is 
perceived by Honneth and Habermas as “behaviorist”5 style in 
contrast with “social interaction”6 (as the root of “social conflict” in 
that it establishes in permanence new practices favourable to the 
greatest number of people, since these one fight for this and not just 
stays in a passive way, as suggested by the French direction. 
According to the German filiation, the social struggle is reminiscent 
- in addition to the question of the permanence of structural 
problems in order to build a society, as Leo Strauss states (Strauss 
1988, 39) - the Simmelian definition of the permanent conflict as a 
vector of all social forms; without forgotten that of Machiavelli's 
(conceived in the same line as Aristotle when it comes to speak 
about the very notion of politeia or belongings), when he states in 
his Speeches on the first decade of Titus-Livius that “the disunion 
of the Senate and the people has made the Roman Republic 
powerful and free” (Machiavelli 1980, 44).  
The althuserian filiation to Lenin can be seen as a return to the 
frame genuine of 17 October (Althusser, Thesis 7), observed already 
in 1963 within the PCF (French Communists Party) elite, for example 
in the French theorist journal Pensée, where Roger Garaudy is 
accused by Althusser as fomenting a “humanist deviation from 
Marxism”7.  
This is also established in the context opened by the Khrushchev 
Report (1956), exclusively charging Stalin, as well as the creation of 
the Berlin Wall (1961) and the beginning of the so-called Maoist 
cultural revolution (1966), without to forget the strengthening of 
Castroism and Sovietism (or “scientific socialism”) in Africa (in 
Algeria, for example, with Ben Bella and Boumediene) and finally 
the Eurocommunism of the PCI (the so call aggiornamento, in 1972). 
A whole environment, which Garaudy also relates it in a note to the 
PCF's PO, in 1965, stating that Althusser and his filiation refuse any 
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“historical compromise” embodied precisely in the 
“aggiornamento” of Eurocommunism (also affecting the PCE 
(Spanish), animated by Semprun and criticized by Garaudy, in his 
1965’s Note). 
Lenin was “a proletarian leader”, Althusser said (Althusser 1982, 
15), confided this way during the meeting with the Executive 
Committee of the Third International (June 19, 1920), according to 
Frossard's report: 
 
There are profound differences between us on the conception of proletarian 
dictatorship. It is the most advanced fraction of the proletariat that becomes 
the state itself, against the bourgeoisie and against the least advanced part of 
the working class, including the reformists whom we treat as bourgeois ». 
(Verdier 1981, 36-37) 
 
This debate is a permanent one. It is, for example, one of the keys 
to understand the split of 1920 within the French Section of the 
Workers International (SFIO), between the Blum-style legitimists 
and the pro-Bolshevik followers of the acceptance of the “21 
conditions” dictated by the so-called “Third International”, in the 
sense that it is not a question of opposing the notion of 
“dictatorship of the proletariat”, as one might think, but of 
opposing the very idea of taking power. Is it a question of perfecting 
a morphological continuity - as defined by historical materialism, 
namely that the bourgeois stage should be over-passed, being unable 
in itself to overcome the objective contradictions of class clashes? 
Or is it a question of just taking power in order to replace just like 
that the “bourgeois class” (as Claude Lefort explains so well in 
Complications: Communism and the Dilemmas of Democracy, 19988), by the 
so-called “proletarian class” (the Lenin “professional revolu-
tionaries”, the “metaphysical race” in Nietzschean way)? But for 
what purpose, if the structural conditions are not reached to do so 
(as the Bolsheviks have well seen), and force the return to the market 
via the NEP, a return that Lenin slowly admitted to having to 
prolong? This is what Leon Blum deduced from it, as Robert 
Verdier reports in his book on the Congress of Tours9. 
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The problem of “replacement” remains relevant today for the up to 
date adepts of the French filiation, who are seeking to constitute a 
kind of “metaphysical race”. The notion of “race” coupled with that 
of “strength” is fundamental to Nietzsche (on which Foucault relies 
in the exergue). He writes this way: 
 
(...) our desire, our very will of knowledge, is a symptom of monstrous 
decadence... We aspire, on the contrary, to what strong races, strong natures 
want - understanding is the end of something (…)”. (Nietzsche 1977, 167) 
 
The notion of “race” next to that of “strong” must then be read in 
a political way. Heidegger sees also its metaphysical side: 
 
Nor is the Will of Power biologically conceived, whereas it is much more 
ontologically conceived, the Nietzschean notion of race has no biological 
significance, but metaphysical significance. (Ibidem, 247) 
 
And what is it to become an element of the “strong race”, in the 
metaphysical and political sense, concrete, practically, if not a god 
human becoming a “professional revolutionary” or the passage 
from “theory to practice”, as for Althusser when he tells, in his 
Memoirs, how he “governed” Ulm? 
Hence the fact that it is not surprising to observe an Althusser 
reconnecting with Lenin (who knows his way around) and thus with 
the idea of the a priori separation between “revolutionaries” and 
“reactionaries”, which Althusser summarizes in his testamentary 
book (The Future Lasts Long...) when he analyses the function of the 
“Red Guards”: 
 
The Marxist-Leninist Cahiers10, after a difficult start, were selling very well. I 
had given them, from the first issue, dedicated to the Cultural Revolution, 
which had just broken out, an unsigned article (whose authenticity I recognize 
here, after Rancière,) where I implemented a simple and false theory based on 
the principle: there are three forms of class struggle, the economic, the 
political and the ideological. They, therefore, require three separate 
organizations to conduct it. We know two of them: the union and the Party. 
The Chinese have just invented the third one: The Red Guards. It was a little 
simple, but it was pleasing (…). 
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The note published by Roger Garaudy (supra) in June 1965 on 
Althusser thus sheds light on the latter's strict affiliation with Lenin 
(Thesis 7) in the name of a “scientific” approach distinct from that 
advocated by the first, accused - according to him - of “humanist 
deviation from Marxism”. In this note, Garaudy observes that 
Althusser's relationship with “science” is very rigid and simplistic, 
referring to various discussions with Italians and Chinese. In fact, 
the “science” of which Althusser speaks is only framed by the 
Leninist-Marxist standard, as Garaudy indicates in his note. 
It turns out that in the 1960s and 1970s, to get out of phenomenology 
(as Foucault points out11) was somehow strategic, especially in the 
midst of the Maoist cultural revolution which, to resume, claimed to 
be not only Lenin who died too soon, but also the purest and hard 
Leninist traces (following Marx and Engels) in the entire history of 
Western thought; a “break” between “idealists and materialists” 
(whereas they are only “moments” of the conceptual movement, as 
Hegel has repeatedly indicated). Why indeed Althusser relies this 
way on Lenin if not to find a theoretical model capable of self-
generation, emancipating himself from the relationship both with 
reality and with the inter-subjectivity of scientists. Thus, Althusser 
relies in his lecture both on Lenin’s Materialism and Empirical Criticism, 
as has been said on Dietzgen also, who keeps to distance “the 
philosophers” treated as “graduate minions”. 
However (let’s start with Derrida), it is precisely this “margin” (as 
in the title of Derrida’s book) that holds the lines, in the sense that 
it allows the latter to rely on Althusser (an Althusser who considers 
Derrida a “giant” (Foucault 1994: 170, 174). This one indeed 
followed not only Althusser's return to Lenin, which practised 
philosophy politically (Althusser 1982: 18, 19) but tried, with Tel 
Quel’s team (Hourmant 1996: 112-128) (including the Maoists 
Philippe Sollers, Julia Kristeva, Alain Badiou, etc.) to go even further 
than Lenin. This is what he states in Positions (Derrida 1972: 86-89). 
Derrida considers that absolute negativity must go so far as to deny 
this need for accountability. He even sees this lack of negativity in 
Lenin (Ibided, 86). Derrida, therefore, claims not only to follow 
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Lenin’s “strategy” but to amplify it, by “reworking” the “rules”. In 
what sense? That of the targeted negation for itself, which would 
extend to the whole of reality and to the very depths of the intimacy 
of language, even in its intimate and secret traces: 
 
So the destruction of the discourse is not a simple neutralization of erasure. It 
multiplies words, precipitates them against each other, engulfs them also in an 
endless and bottomless substitution whose only rule is the sovereign 
affirmation of the meaningless game. Not the reserve or the withdrawal, the 
infinite murmur of a white word erasing the traces of the classical discourse 
but a kind of potlatch of signs, burning, consuming, wasting words in the gay 
affirmation of death: a sacrifice and a challenge.  
Note 1: Play is nothing but an open and unreserved challenge to what opposes 
play" (Note on the margins of this unpublished Theory of Religion that 
Bataille planned to call "Dying with laughter and laughing with death. (Derrida 
1967, 403) 
 
This “position” is strategic. Because, at the same time, it is 
destroyed, it makes possible to be replaced by one which destroys it 
(as Lenin has shown); for instance, in the same movement, Derrida 
“deconstructs” but escapes the ruins of this absolute negativity, and 
becomes, at the same time, the positive reference framework for any 
sketch of negativity while saying the opposite, of course. It’s not too 
far of Lenin’s way: 
 
The unity (coincidence, identity, equivalence) of opposites is conditional, 
temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle between mutually exclusive 
opposites is absolute, as is the development and movement.” (Lenin 1973, 
344). 
 
What is preserved or denied as positive is therefore not a given 
determination, set aside, suspended or elevated in a synthesis, as in 
Hegel or Marx, but only the need to bind oneself to the opposite, it 
is the moment of “unity” in order to struggle then with it, to exclude 
it absolutely; it is precisely this struggle for life in a pure state 
(criticized by Horkheimer as a bourgeois moment, techniques of 
science, positivism reducing reason to instrumental logic 
(Horkheimer 1974), which is also defended by Nietzsche. What is 
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then preserved is only the “moment of the connection”: it serves 
only to trigger the movement in view of self-movement, since Lenin 
says it is the “negativity which is the internal pulsation of self-
movement and life” (Lenin 1973, 135). And this is done in a 
concrete way. In Lenin, every concrete being is placed as a potential 
void if its mass contains a direction or density that does not 
correspond to the desired measure. This is indeed absolute 
subjectivism (“above the Begriff is the Idea”12), which tactically 
avoids “pure negation” because Lenin wants something real, 
sovereign power (but not as Derrida wants just spiritual power). 
Lenin wants to be the living principle that decides the appropriate 
reality. Without the sacred garment, however, which Stalin hastened 
to put on. Derrida will thus undermine this claim to extend 
negativity by extending her domain towards language (take a look 
on John R.Searle/Derrida controversy about Austin’s legacy13 and 
the letter against Derrida's Honorary Degree in The Times (London) 
(Saturday, May 9, 199214), towards also reason and social order in 
itself, and not this or that kind of rationality and social order.  
 
Lenin, then. But not Stalin. While the last continues this first 
(Ellenstein 1984: 162, 171, 189), as Bataille pointed out (Bataille 
1949: 183, 186, 198-199, 222): 
 
The resolute disregard for individual interest, thought, convenience and 
personal rights was from the very beginning the result of the Bolshevik 
revolution. In this respect, Stalin's politics accuse the features of Lenin's but 
do not innovate it. The “Bolshevik firmness” is opposed to “rotten 
liberalism”. (...) In truth, marvellous mental chaos results from the action of 
Bolshevism in the world, and from the passivity, the moral non-existence, that 
it has encountered. But history may be the only one likely to put an end to it, 
by some military decision. We can only propose to look for the nature of this 
action, which disturbs the established order before our eyes, much more 
deeply than Hitler could have done. (...) If we are exhausted, only terror and 
exaltation allow us to escape the slackness. Without a violent stimulus, Russia 
could not get back on track. (...) It is cruel to desire the extension of a regime 
based on a secret police, the gagging of thought and many concentration 
camps. But there would be no Soviet camps in the world if a huge movement 
of human masses had not responded to an urgent need. 
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The same framework can be seen in Maurice Blanchot:  
 
I would like to quote this text by Alexander Blok, the great poet of the Twelve, 
whom the October Revolution, however, frightened: “The Bolsheviks do not 
prevent us from writing verses, but they prevent us from feeling like a master; 
the one who carries within himself the pole of his inspiration, his creation and 
holds the rhythm is a master. (Blanchot 1971, 113-114) 
 
And Blanchot, on whom Derrida (in Parages, Spectres de Marx) relies 
first and foremost, also writes this about “negation”: 
 
He who stays with negation cannot use it. Who belongs to him, in this 
belonging can no longer leave him, because he belongs to the neutrality of 
absence where he is already no longer himself. This situation is, perhaps, 
despair, not what Kierkegaard calls "disease to death", but this disease where 
dying does not lead to death, where one no longer hopes in death, where death 
is no longer to come but is that who no longer comes” (Blanchot 1955, 125). 
 
It is also in this sense that Gilles Deleuze uses the term 
“differential”. In its meaning, order, unity, self, or integrative 
support, exists only as “variation” (Deleuze 1968, 224) (roaming, 
random) of the permanent drift, the only accepted constant, the only 
“Idea” (in the sense of Lenin, supra) whose contortions then create 
“varieties” (of human being, for instance, such as various “queer” 
with “care values” in Foucault’s system, which is very near from 
Deleuze matrix, as Foucault often said). And these only exist for 
themselves in so far as they express the un(limited) in(defined)finite 
aspect of the mother matrix, that of permanent drift without ending, 
even the Dead, since we must (sollen) be already dead (according to 
Blanchot). This is also observed by Lyotard: 
 
Where do you make your criticism from? Don't you see that criticizing is still 
knowing, knowing better? That the critical relationship is still inscribed in the 
sphere of knowledge, of “awareness” and therefore of empowerment? We 
must drift out of criticism. Much more: the drift is by itself the end of 
criticism. (Lyotard 1972, 15) 
 
The drift is carried out by acting on it, by putting it in condition, such 
as the wave which needs an obstacle to refract because it is unable 
Brolly. Journal of Social Sciences 2 (1) 2019 
15 
to do so internally since there is no impetus or external-internal 
differentiation in Deleuze. There is no orientation, no hierarchy, no 
priority, no better or worse, there is only one thing, only one, the 
drift, knowing that there are no more shores, except that of 
dissolving - the supreme “Idea”. For example, it is a question of 
posing at the beginning of any emotional series that exists an idea 
acting as a “pure element of potentiality” (Deleuze 1968, 227) 
without past or future, such as a matrix with frames without inside 
or outside, except the instant, and which possess the “first 
coefficient or first derivative”, which will then determine “the other 
derivatives and consequently all the terms of the series resulting 
from the same operations” (Ibidem). This means, moreover, that it is 
not pleasure but the random triggering of desire in what it brings as 
a plane, form, click of clicks in (de)finite and repeated allowing the 
unlimited drift of the dissolved self in the generalized hallucination 
or the “I cracked” and the “dissolved self” (Deleuze 1968: 223, 332). 
This is why Deleuze prefers Artaud to Carroll. What matters is, 
above all, the drift alone, and not what can trigger it as a primary 
element, as Lyotard said anyway (supra).  
Thus, in a Sado-Maso experience (also highly prized by Foucault) 
at the borders of a strong opiate intake, apparently necessary to 
anaesthetize oneself, especially when it comes to seams and burns: 
 
What is this masochist doing? He seems to imitate the horse, Equus Eroticus, 
but that's not it. The horse, and the master trainer, the mistress, are no more 
images of mother or father. It is a completely different question, an animal 
becoming essential to masochism, a question of forces. The masochist 
presents it this way: training axiom - destroy instinctive forces to replace them 
with transmitted forces (...). The renunciation of external pleasure, or its delay, 
its infinite distance, on the contrary, testifies to a conquered state where desire 
no longer lacks anything, fills itself with itself and builds its field of 
immanence. Pleasure is the affection of a person or a subject, it is the only 
way for a person to “find his way around” in the process of desire that 
overflows him; pleasures, even the most artificial, are reterritorializations. But 
precisely, is it necessary to meet again? (Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 191-194) 
 
This is typically the very economy of what can be called “neo-
Leninism”. Because we do not see in this name that this process 
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would not enter into general equivalence with the rest, with what is 
transmitted at the same time by the blow: a way of being in the 
world, of being submissive, ordered, to go and haunt the Château of 
masters in “negation” (especially if they boast of being from the 
1807’s vintage version of Blanchot), selling themselves as voluntary 
victims who believe they also command the process. Since they are 
already consenting, to what? To integrate the becoming “red guard” 
(as Blacks Blocs) in the Althusser way. How? By wishing to 
“libidinally” address boots and then gradually “destroy instinctive 
forces to replace them with transmitted forces” which, in the long 
run, make increasingly illusory to find one’s way around when it 
comes to politically fight these boots that we so 
psychophysiologically desire (as Blacks Blocs). Thus, for Foucault, 
Deleuze’s book The Anti-Oedipus is “the book” par excellence of the 
destruction of the self, reduced to a conjunctural and conjectural 
cluster of polarization of intensities. It is considered as a book of 
ethics, the “only book of ethics written for a long time” - Foucault 
wrote15. Do thus see that the Bolsheviks correspond perfectly to it, 
putting in shape this “new barbarity” of which Blanchot speaks, 
adds Bataille, their “marvellous mental chaos” (Bataille 1949, 186) 
and their “resolute disregard for self-interest, though, convenience 
and personal rights” (Ibidem, 183)? 
In the end, it is a question of destroying oneself in order to 
prevent the body from using its power to organize itself in the 
world. 
This is the artist’s last work: Brutus, who can become Orpheus 
if he knows how to handle the dagger of negation reduced to itself: 
 
He who recognizes for his essential task the effective action within history, 
cannot prefer artistic action. Art acts badly and acts little. It is clear that if 
Marx had followed his childhood dreams and written the most beautiful 
novels in the world, he would have enchanted the world, but would not have 
shaken it. We must, therefore, write Le Capital and not War and Peace. We must 
not paint Caesar's murder, we must be Brutus. These connections, these 
comparisons will seem absurd to the viewers. But, as soon as art is measured 
against action, immediate and urgent action can only prove it wrong, and art 
can only prove itself wrong. (Blanchot 1955, 284) 
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This is therefore where the Blanchotien-Battaillian (and therefore 
Foucaldo-Deleuziano-Lyotardo-Derridian) “communism” is locat-
ed. Thus, a Brutus - the Blanchotian artist - is in the search of an 
“end” that would have “the heaviness of a new beginning” (L’espace 
littéraire, 330) like a knife wound which, unceasingly falls down and 
repeats itself. Since that which kills something unreal, unimportant, 
simple, anonymous real material of inspiration in order to exhale, to 
suck in endlessly, like a voracious spectrum whose image perceived 
in the eyes of the Eurydice is the only possible sceptre: 
 
The basis of failure is the restarting of the experiment, not the fact that it is 
not successful. Everything always starts all over again - yes, once again, again, 
again, again. (Blanchot 1955: 331-332) 
 
Or, how to scatter its melodies and other members in order, 
Blanchot said, to “repudiate also the principle of which the god is 
only the support and try to leave the circle where, since always, 
under his guard as under the guard of humanism, we remain locked 
in the fascination of unity” (Blanchot 1971, 85). 
It would also seem that, when Bataille uses the notions of 
“acephalus” i.e. “not knowing” (as Nietzsche said, supra) and when 
Blanchot talks about Eurydice and Brutus, it seems that Bataille and 
Blanchot were trying to make France, after Russia, the permanent 
acephalon. 
More generally, what appears in the French intelligentsia under 
fascist and Leninist influence is a kind of psychological and aesthetic 
preparation (well seen by Walter Benjamin (Hollier 1979, 586) when 
he observes Bataille and his group) to flight forward within the 
destruction of internal and external reason by justifying it by the 
anti-capitalist struggle. For Bataille et Blanchot, it is, therefore, 
necessary to have the strength to say no to the man of work, to his 
reason and needs, and, at the same time, yes, to force whatever 
comes forth. 
Look now at Foucault. Let us start, for example, from Foucault’s 
fascination for Pierre Rivière’s speech, who explains, calmly, 
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without a wrinkle or a word underlined, not what he has done but 
what he has already written in the heart of reality, the a posteriori 
speech only reflecting on it to erase it: 
 
We have here, however, a phenomenon of which I do not see any equivalents 
in the history of both crime and discourse: that is, a crime accompanied by 
such a strong and strange discourse that the crime ends up no longer existing, 
escaping, by the very fact of this discourse which is held on it by the person 
who committed it. (Foucault 1994, T. III, 98) 
 
To imitate this, Foucault uses Borges’ work, whose presence 
occupies the book Les mots et les choses (1966) from the first line of 
the Pre/face (before/face): 
 
This book was born in a text by Borges. (...). This text quotes “a certain 
Chinese encyclopedia” where it is written that “animals are divided into: a) 
belonging to the Emperor, b) embalmed, c) tamed, d) suckling pigs, e) sirens, 
f) fabulous, g) dogs in freedom, h) included in this classification, i) which 
agitate like madmen, j) countless, k) drawn with a very fine brush of camel 
hair, l) and cætera, m) which break the crust, n) which from afar seem to be 
flies. 
In the wonder of this taxonomy, what we reach with a leap, what, thanks to 
the apologist, is indicated to us as the exotic charm of another thought, is the 
limit of ours: the naked impossibility of thinking that. (...) This text by Borges 
made me laugh for a long time, not without certain unease and difficult to 
overcome. (Foucault 1966, 7) 
 
Let us also observe that this text, which so amazes Foucault and 
which “made him laugh for a long time” is nevertheless, in the 
beginning, that of a Borges who, it seems, works as a literary writer 
and not as a sociologist or historian of the human sciences. In other 
words, this writer, Borges, seeks to bring together, even to the 
absurd (in the pataphysical sense of an Ionesco), the distance 
between words and things in various syntactic spins. This implies 
that “the naked impossibility of thinking” is not a naked 
impossibility if one thinks of its possibility in the context of poetics. 
What is surprising, however, is Foucault's astonishment.  
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As if he was wondering, at heart, whether it would be possible or 
not to think of this “naked impossibility” in a dressed, disguised 
way.  
Indeed, if there is “the naked impossibility of thinking”, in the 
scientific framework where the book Les mots et les choses is located, 
it is possible to dress this nudity, there, with a trompe l’oeil scientific - 
here History - precisely to make the absurd real and the real absurd. 
Under these conditions, the result achieved allows the construction 
of a custom-made covering that gives the appearance of rigorous 
research but which has been made only to shape things (in 
Foucault’s words) and not in the real history of the sciences that he 
addresses in his book. 
The habit, therefore, not only acts as a monk but, above all, 
becomes the only form of reality. Like these ghost ships which, seen 
from the distance, seem to be inhabited, there is even a man at the 
helm (inside, in fact), only one skeleton (that of a Borges-style 
classification) who remains the last work on the canvas of meaning. 
Thus, in Les mots et les choses Foucault seems like taking the word 
Borges: building a classification that, for example, artificially 
opposes the categories of representation and meaning or who so 
meticulously perceives, in the presence of an “organization” 
(Foucault 1966, 243) of science, a place in which “death prowls 
around” (Ibidem, p. 395). In short, Foucault transvestite in Borges 
will have to create a story, a fiction, in order to put it as a framework 
for “atopy”, “aphasia” (Ibidem, 10). What does this mean? Foucault, 
although he like Pierre Rivière (supra), writes beforehand what he 
will accomplish (like Lenin). 
Indeed, the Foucauldian discourse seizes (as a Nietzschean 
member of the “metaphysical race”) upon the “fundamental codes 
of a culture” (Foucault 1966, 11) in order not to explain but to 
emerge as this culture itself (Ibidem, 396-397): 
 
Thus, the last man is both older and younger than the death of God; since he 
has killed God, it is he himself who must answer for his own finiteness; but 
since it is in the death of God that he speaks, thinks and exists, his murder 
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himself is doomed to die; new, the same gods are already swelling the future 
Ocean; man will disappear. More than the death of God, -or rather in the wake 
of that death and according to a deep correlation with it, what Nietzsche's 
thought announces is the end of his murderer; it is the bursting of man's face 
in laughter, and the return of masks; it is the dispersion of the deep flow of 
time by which he felt carried and of which he suspected the pressure in the 
very being of things; it is the identity of the Return of the Same and the 
absolute dispersion of man.  
 
Foucault thus floats like these “new gods” who “already inflate the 
future Ocean” by accomplishing this so-called “absolute dispersion 
of man” previously thought of by Althusser (who also quotes 
Foucault on this point in his testament book, L'avenir dure longtemps. 
Let us also look at this other extract16, which will allow us to see 
how Foucault produces some too obvious traces of his History of 
Madness:  
 
I was told that madness did not exist, whereas the problem was absolutely the 
opposite: it was a question of how madness, under the different definitions 
that could be given to it at one time, could be integrated into an institutional 
field that constituted it as a mental illness with a certain place alongside other 
diseases. 
 
Thus, the question was how madness “could be integrated into an 
institutional field that constituted it as a mental illness”. It was, 
therefore, according to Foucault, “an institutional field” that 
“constituted” it as “mental illness”.  
In other words, without this “institutional field”, madness would 
not be constituted as a mental illness. What would madness have 
been constituted as? Has “madness” thus constituted itself? Could 
madness think of itself? Foucault said: “I was told that madness did 
not exist, whereas the problem was absolutely the opposite”. If the 
problem is the other way around, could it mean that what exists as 
madness is not madness? If the problem is “absolutely opposed” to 
the fact that madness does not exist, therefore something exists, 
whose word is not madness in the sense of “mental illness”. Or does 
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Foucault presuppose that what is called “madness” is not, in fact, as 
such, so beyond the “constitutional field” that constituted it? 
This is what he will say next since he will advance, and rather in 
retrospect, that for him it is rather a status, but he has not studied 
its medical aspect. Nevertheless, he pronounces himself on it both 
implicitly and quite explicitly by presupposing that the institution, 
the word, constitutes the thing, madness, as a mental illness whereas 
it is, for Foucault, quite another thing.  
In short, under the pretext, in fact, that certain medical practices 
may have hastily categorized certain people as “crazy” when they 
were rather weakened, out of phase, etc., it does not follow that we 
must deny the morphological problems of personality dislocation 
beyond the word that claims to subsume the thing. 
Unless an a priori arbitrary posit that this dislocation is as valid 
as a deepening of its unity and, even better, is preferable because it 
can thus perceive multiplicity as “acephalic” (Bataille) and thus 
avoid bourgeois accumulation, a premise of the liberal order is a 
question of drying up at its source. Now, this domination is what 
Foucault wants to fight against, at least if we want to eradicate the 
“General who is in us”, according to Deleuze’s words in L’anti-
Oedipe II (Deleuze & Guattari 1980, 36). 
At least that is what Foucault believes, whereas the consequences 
are frightening, including for others, since in the horizon of this 
“end of man” it is not certain that the “alternatives” envisaged by 
him will best suit this “end”: 
 
It is often said that the definitions of the Islamic government are imprecise. 
On the contrary, they seemed very familiarly clear to me, but I must say, rather 
uncomfortable. These are the basic formulas of democracy, bourgeois or 
revolutionary, I said; we have not stopped repeating them since the 18th 
century, and you know what they have led to. But I was immediately answered: 
The Koran had stated them long before your philosophers and if the Christian 
and industrial West have lost their meaning, Islam will be able to preserve 
their value and effectiveness17. 
 
Thus, what would not be very “reassuring” does not come from the 
much more totalitarian than communitarian essence of this so-called 
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“Islamic government” which claims, through “Islam”, to find 
“meaning”, but from the fact that “the definitions of the Islamic 
government” are “the basic formulas of democracy, bourgeois or 
revolutionary (...) we have not stopped repeating them since the 
18th century, and you know what they have led to”.  
What does this mean? Where did they “lead”? Undoubtedly 
towards the most “confinement”, “order”, in the official version of 
the Foucauldian word. While in Iran everyone is immersed in the 
joy of rediscovering the “meaning”. 
Thus, this “destruction” resulting from Leninism and (vulgar) 
Nietzscheism and produced by the French filiation is, in fact, a kind 
of new totalitarianism, i.e. it is theoretically rectified in the sense that 
it is no longer a question of killing a race or a class but everything 
that in the human race would be similar to self-development, the 
supposed source of evil, and whose (“theoretical”) killing would be 
a proof of the work to be done to rise to the rank of the superhuman 
killer of God.  
In this case, it is a question of an unlimited absolutism which 
nevertheless wants to be authentic, originating in its theoretical 
revolt, whereas in practice it is a question of the renewed yoke of 
this new “metaphysical race” resulting from the “professional 
revolutionaries” (appointed by the State as “organic intellectuals” 
such as Althusser at Ulm street in Paris, inside the famous Latin 
Quarter etc. etc.) for whom it is no longer a question of biology but 
of applying the “class struggle in theory”. The important thing is to 
know for which “class” this “struggle” is being carried out. 
All depends on which step we have come. Like Blanchot said, 
Brutus killing Caesar, Orpheus killing Eurydice; is it better to write 
War and Peace, as Tolstoï? And this until a repetition without 
difference: Republic, language, thought, sex, everything must 
wander, error, (t)error. That of an empty, emptied, lifeless, 
bloodless, and high-speed “differrance” (or permanent voluntary 
random) while remaining in a tremendous way, waiting maybe the 
new God (the very death of Man and his Freedom Right) in secret 
excitement. The postmodern deconstructivist way of life seems 
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opening up, more and more, mind and arms, at the pre-democratic, 
tyranny regime, while hypocritically denouncing it on the media 
network mainstream. 
Leninism, in fact, never ends to “move away” from us only if we 
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